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Abstract
This article develops a novel probabilistic approach to evaluate -to be intended as provide
an approximation formula- a patent-protected R&D project at a fixed date under very general
conditions. In a real option framework we introduce Spatial Mixed Poisson Processes to de-
scribe the dynamics of the project value. In such a fashion, the model is able to account for
competition among firms and several sources of uncertainty such as time-to-completion of the
project, exogenous shocks, input cost uncertainty, technical uncertainty and asymmetric infor-
mation under different cost structures. The proposed evaluation procedure is of the Bayesian
type, in that it moves from the knowledge of some information collected before the evaluation
date.
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1 Introduction
Optimal decision-making for taking out a patent is a complex task, exacerbated by the presence of
competitiveness and uncertainty. These two characterizing features are intrinsically related, recip-
rocally entangled. Competitiveness is a source of uncertainty and the latter feeds into the former
making it tougher. Indeed, in a competing context the decision maker has to take into account not
only the factors that affect his own strategies, but also the factors affecting other investors’ decisions.
Uncertainty about others’ actions -on the one side- urges taking out the patent in order to avoid
being cut out by preemption. On the other side, there are situations in which it may be convenient
to wait for the others’ move. An example of the latter situation is provided by the millions of vaccine
doses for H1N1 flu unsold, or unused and resold from developed to developing countries in 2010. In
this case, it would have been optimal to wait for the others’ action, at the risk of losing the first
mover’s benefit.
This paper deals with the basic step of this decision process, which consists in estimating the project
value. More specifically, the main contribution consists in proposing a method to approximate
the expected value of the patent at a fixed date. The procedure we implement to obtain such
a result is based on the information collected before the evaluation date, and in this sense it may be
viewed as of the Bayesian type.
Patent race, namely the issue of valuing an R&D project finalized to take out a patent in a com-
peting and uncertain environment, has extensively been treated in the economic literature (Kamien
and Schwartz, 1972; Loury, 1979; Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1980; Fudenberg et al., 1983; Harris and
Vickers, 1985, 1987; Beath et al., 1989; Nti, 1997; Weeds, 2002; Grishagin et al., 2001; Lambrecht
and Perraudin, 2003; Miltersen and Schwartz, 2004; Pawlina and Kort, 2006; Meng, 2008; Pennings
and Sereno, 2011; just to cite a few). In spite of the importance that uncertainty plays in patenting
and more in general in R&D-intensive firms activity, the theoretical literature is scant in modelling
and capturing it. Some authors explicitely mention the existence of multiple sources of uncertainty
(Grishagin et al. 2001; Miltersen and Schwartz, 2004; Meng, 2008), but no papers have succeeded
in capturing them at once. Different works focus on different sources of uncertainty, according to
the specific issue the paper wants to examine in depth.
At its very essence, the multiplicity of uncertainties can be traced back to the long investment time
horizon of patenting activity and more generally of R&D. Uncertainty about the time-to-completion
magnifies the other sources of uncertainty, the longer and the more uncertain the R&D phase is,
the riskier the project becomes.
In the literature one can found different, and partially overlapping, definitions of the sources of un-
certainty. The most cited are: cash flow uncertainty, technical uncertainty, exogenous shocks, input
cost uncertainty and competitive uncertainty.
Because different sources of uncertainty interact with each other, leaving some of them out of the
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formal scheme may be misleading in terms of project valuation.
The model we are going to present in the following sections accounts for all the sources of uncertainty
aforementioned and the firms are assumed to operate in a competitive environment. Encompassing
all the sources of uncertainty in a unique model is quite difficult, because it greatly complicates the
algebra, but the task is worth tackling given the importance that uncertainty plays in R&D man-
agement and ultimately in policy intervention. Within the real options framework, the task can be
accomplished by abandoning the continuous time framework, typical of patent race models, and by
using a particular type of discrete process, the Spatial Mixed Poisson Process (SMPP). This process
generalizes the standard Spatial Processes derived by jumps occurring according to a Poisson Law.
The adoption of random point processes in applied works is well-acknowledged in the literature. We
refer to Volf (2009), Syamsundar and Naikan (2009) and Jacobsen (2006) for a survey of theory and
applications. Concerning the general theory of spatial point processes, a complete survey can be
found in Daley and Vere-Jones (1988) and Stoyan et al. (1995). While, for the case of SMPPs, we
also refer to Cerqueti et al. (2009), where the development of an insurance-reinsurance model is
provided.
In our context, from an economic point of view, the use of SMPP allows to overcome some restric-
tive hypothesis, typical of R&D valuation literature. In particular, first of all, it allows tackling the
problem of determining the value of a project related to a patent in the presence of jumps in the un-
derlying asset with negative and positive sizes. Secondly, thinking of a negative jump due to
other firms attainment, it can happen, and indeed it does, that the novelty contained in
the others’ patent is not so crucial, being, let us say, an invention around attainment.1
This aspect is particularly relevant, in that it captures the fact that negative events can
engender heterogesous impacts on the patent value according to the events themselves,
but also to the timing of the event. For instance, the same event will likely impact
differently on the value of the patent according to whether it occurs before or after the
proclamation of a new patent-protecting law or of a new fiscal regulation. In general,
the patent under valuation suffers from a negative jump in its value, but this may however not be
large enough to make the patent worthless. An original feature of our approach is that the amount
of the jumps is not known beforehand. To sum up, the killing jump is not restricted to the first
negative jump that may occur, but only a large enough jump can kill the patenting activity. Thirdly,
there is a random delay in the transmission of the jump from the stochastic process representing
a given source of uncertainty to the cash flow generated by the project. This plays an important
role in modeling random processes with different jump behaviors. It has never been clarified in the
existing literature why other firms’ attainment should bring about an immediate obsolescence in the
1By invention around it is commonly meant an invention which achieves the same or similar functions using a
different means and not violating the claims of the original patent.
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patent that is being valued. For instance, in the consumer electronics field it takes time before a
new product is marketed and, once it is, it takes time before it is sufficiently widespread to cut to
nil the profit deriving from the ”old” patent. In such a case, the assumption of a no-delay condition
would be a na¨ıve approximation. Fourthly, we accommodate the case of the winner-takes-all as a
special case of the winner-does-not-take-all game. Fifthly, exogenous shocks are supposed to impact
with different intensities on the competing firms. Finally, the adoption of SMPP allows to take into
account the dependence between time and size of the jumps in the underlying security. We will turn
to these points in more details below.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next Section outlines the basic problem motivat-
ing this research. Section 3 is devoted to the construction of a theoretical framework, taking into
account multiple sources of uncertainty. IN addition, this Section contains some preliminary results,
along with the formal definition of SMPP. Section 4 concerns the technical conditions stopping the
patent race. A Bayesian estimate of the value of the project is derived in Section 5 and its economic
implications are discussed in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes and outlines future research.
Some mathematical derivations are provided in the Appendix.
2 The basic problem
Consider a new technology developed by firm A that can possibly be monopolized by taking out a
patent. Throughout the paper we will refer to P¯ as the patent, or project P¯ , or simply the project.
Let us suppose the economic environment to be populated by other N competitive firms investing
in R&D to develop new technologies, including the one related to P¯ . We adopt the point of view
of firm A and we seek a theoretical estimate of the expected value of the project. In doing so, a
real option type approach is followed2. The patent race problem is strictly connected to the study
of the optimal time for taking out the patent P¯ . Clearly, the patent is attainable after the full
development of the related technology, let us say at the random time τ1, representing uncertainty in
time-to-completion. It follows that the problem of optimal timing for patent protection is considered
only when the firm accomplishes the R&D phase and is ready to register the patent P¯ .
At its very essence, the structure of the model works as follows. In accordance with the real options
literature, the cash flow is taken as the underlying security, or state. The changes in the cash
flow immediately affect the value of the derivative, namely the project. In similarity with financial
models, the real options literature treats the value of the project as a derivative, which means that
it is supposed to be a function of its underlying security. The value of the project does not coincide
with the value of the cash flow in that the firms have forward looking expectations. Typically,
2Notice that by the words ”theoretical estimate” we refer to the fact, that being the jumps in the underlying
security stochastic in time and size and being the transmission time of these jumps stochastic itself, it is necessary to
estimate the expected value of the impact of the jumps on patenting activity.
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R&D investments do not generate cash flow in an early stage, but they unfold their productive
effects after a (long) period. In turn, this fact does not imply that the project is worthless in the
investment period, as rational economic agents take into account future returns and they know that
even if the project does not immediately generate cash flow, it will do in the future. The cash flow is
supposed to be composed of two parts: a regular flow deriving from the scheduled outflows and an
extraordinary flow, subject to stochastic fluctuations due to the economic context and competition.
More specifically, some events occur during the race at discrete times. These events are captured by
the jumps of N +1 distinct stochastic point processes. One of these represents the shocks occurring
in the economy, e.g. changes in regulation, demand shifts, taste variations, etc. The remaining N
processes represent the progresses of the other N firms taking part in the race. The random jumps
occurring in the N +1 processes affect A’s cash flow with a certain random intensity and at random
time. We will come back to the details of the transmission mechanism which determines the sizes of
the jumps in Section 3. For the time being, we highlight that the time at which the events occur in
the N +1 processes are not necessarily the same time at which the cash flow is affected. Indeed, the
jumps in the N+1 processes do not immediately propagate to A’s cash flow, but only after a certain
random delay. Moreover, also the N players different from A are affected by exogenous shocks. It is
worth recalling that the jumps in the cash flow propagate immediately to the value of the project,
without any delay. Since the cash flow jumps with a certain delay with respect to the occurrence of
the event, the jumps in the cash flow that will occur ”tomorrow”, are partially due to the jumps in
the N + 1 stochastic processes occurred ”today”. Hence, to value the patenting activity in a future
date one must give an estimate of the jumps in the N + 1 processes already occurred, the effect of
which will be exerted in the future.
Summarizing: the underlying security, A’s cash flow, is affected by exogenous shocks and by the
events affecting the other N players. In turn, the latter are affected by exogenous shocks as well.
Hence, exogenous shocks feed into the underlying security twice, directly and indirectly via the
competitors. The transmission of the shocks is not restricted to be immediate and one to one, but
occurs with random delay and intensity. Figure 1 graphically depicts this composite situation.
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
Caption: The jumps occurring in the economy affect the firm’s cash flow with a random delay.
The delayed transformations are captured by the arrays in the graph.
The cash flow process is such to account for uncertainty of cash flow itself as well as technical
uncertainty. The process describing exogenous shocks accounts also for input cost uncertainty. The
random processes, by modeling competition, account for uncertainty coming from a competitive en-
vironment and asymmetric information under an asymmetric cost structure. The context is assumed
to be one in which the winner does not necessarily take all.
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2.1 The formalization of the problem.
To formalize the model, let us introduce a probability space with filtration (Ω,F , {Ft}t≥0, P ), con-
taining all the random variables introduced in the following. We denote as T the set of stopping
times in [0,+∞), i.e.
T = {τ : Ω→ [0,+∞) | {τ ≤ t} ∈ Ft, ∀ t ≥ 0}. (1)
To model time-to-completion uncertainty, let us define the random time at which the new technology
is fully developed by A as τ1 ∈ T . The optimal timing problem can be rephrased in searching for
the random time τ2 that is optimal for taking out P¯ and such that τ2(ω) ≥ τ1(ω), for each ω ∈ Ω.
Fix t > 0 and denote as Ct the random value of the project P¯ for A at time t. The quantity Ct
is random in that it depends on the future events concerning the life of the firms involved in the
patent race and on the economic environment.
The patent is assumed to be optimally taken out when the expected value of Ct reaches a certain
time-dependent deterministic threshold Γt. More formally, let us introduce the difference process
dt = Γt − E[Ct], (2)
where E indicates the expected value operator. Thus, the stopping time τ2 can be written as follows:
τ2 =

 inf{t ≥ τ1 | dt ≤ 0}, if E[dτ1 ] > 0;τ1, if E[dτ1 ] ≤ 0. (3)
Of course A must compete with several other firms, which try to obtain the registration of the same
or similar patents. Therefore, τ1 or τ2 may also be equal to +∞ when the patent race ends in favor
of a firm different from A. We will label these situations as game over conditions, and they will be
discussed in Section 4.
The optimization problem related to τ2 in (3) depends on two components: the time-dependent
threshold Γt and the expected value of the project E[Ct]. This paper proposes a Bayesian method
for estimating E[Ct] in a very general framework. Since the estimation procedure is quite technical,
we have chosen to focus only on this issue, without devoting much efforts neither to the identifica-
tion of Γt, which can be exogenously or endogenously determined, nor to the optimization problem.
Nevertheless, the results obtained hereafter will set up the basis for a follow up study coping with
the optimization problem. For the time being, tackling the optimization problem exceedingly com-
plicates and lengthens the paper.
3 The sources of uncertainty and the underlying asset
The theoretical analysis of patent race interactions is given through the introduction of quantitative
processes translating qualitative occurrences. This approach has been already used in the literature,
6
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and the idea of a random process transforming qualitative events into quantitative amounts is first
attributable to Pindyck (1993).3
3.1 Overview of the main elements of the model
This subsection introduces the main components of the patent race problem. Since the argument is
rather technical, we prefer to treat separately the conditions granting the existence of competition
among firms (the so-called game over conditions, see the next section). For the time being it will be
assumed that the patent race never stops.
Let us introduce a stochastic process T describing the evolution of A’s cash flow, directly related
to P¯ . We also assume that all the sources of uncertainty impact on the cash flow generated by
the R&D investment project.It follows that T collects R&D expenses, the inflows and the outflows
stemming from the events in the economic environment and the competition with the other N firms
populating the market. A formal definition of T will be presented below.
The time-dependent value of P¯ for A can be explicitly written by collecting information on the
process T . For this reason T represents the underlying asset.
To formalize the sources of uncertainty and analyze their interaction rules, a multivariate point
process is needed, with N +1 components given by: an exogenous process S that captures the quan-
titative translation of the shocks occurring in the economic system, including input cost uncertainty;
a stochastic process Uk describing the cash flows of the k-th firm’s R&D process, with k = 1, . . . , N .
All the sources of uncertainty affect A′s cash flow (see Figure 2 for a representation of such reticular
relationships).
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
Caption: the arrows point out that the realizations of T are driven by the evolution of the
multivariate process (S,U1, . . . , UN ) and, furthermore, Uk depends on S, for each k.
From A’s point of view, Uk represents a proxy for the speed of the technological renewal process
and the interest in new technologies of the k-th firm involved in the patent race. Uk captures un-
certainty arising from a competitive environment and asymmetric information under an asymmetric
cost structure. In such a way, besides uncertainty arising from time-to-completion, we manage to
capture uncertainty due to exogenous shocks, S, technical uncertainty (or entity of R&D expenses,
or cost-to-completion), competitive interactions, asymmetric information and finally investment cost
asymmetry. All these components impact differently on Uk and are somehow reflected on A’s cash
flow. Modelling separately the dynamics of each competitor’s cash flow, Uk, we have the highest
possible degree of asymmetry and uncertainty.
3In his setting a Geometric Brownian Motion is assumed to capture the shocks in the economy, which feed into
the underlying state dynamics, the industry’s inverse demand curve. The underlying state determines the value of
the option to invest.
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3.2 Exogenous shocks in the economy: process S.
The exogenous shocks in the economy are captured by a process S = {(τSi , ξ
S
i )}i∈N, where τ
S
i and
ξSi represent the random time and size of the i-th shock, for each i ∈ N, respectively. In particular,
τSi ∈ T , ξ
S
i ∈ FτSi and ξ
S
i takes on values in R.
The random variables ξSi are supposed i.i.d. and independent from {τ
S
i }i∈N. Moreover, the following
key assumption on the stochastic structure of S will stand in force hereafter.
Assumption 1. The process S is a SMPP with mixing distribution Π and baseline intensity measure
M .
For a formal definition of SMPP, see Subsection 3.5.
An economic explanation of Assumption 1 is in order.
The process S captures also the component of uncertainty pertaining to the so called catastrophic
events, that are related to negative jumps (McDonald and Siegel, 1986; Miltersten and Schwartz,
2004; Schwartz, 2004). However, hypothesizing only negative jumps to occur would be an unrealistic
assumption. Indeed, there are many events which could have positive influence, e.g. a more favorable
patent-protection law, more effective or rigorous enforcement policies, a complementary discovery
accelerating patent attainment, a reduction in patenting cost, a reduction in the renewal fee schedule,
etc. In addition, it is unrealistic to assume that the size of the jump is predetermined (in this
respect see Weeds, 2002; Lambrect Perraudin, 2003). Abandoning the assumption that S follows a
Poisson process, typical in the literature, and allowing it to follow a SMPP, we easily overcome both
assumptions.4 In this framework, jumps are not restricted to take on only negative values. Being
ξSi random, the size of the jump is unknown a priori. As a consequence, it is possible to generalize
the effect of a negative jump and remove the restriction that any negative jump, in particular the
first, can kill the patenting activity. Negative jumps ”small” in size will induce a drawback, but not
necessarily put an end to the activity. This characteristic is particularly important for R&D activity
characterized by high entry and exit sunk costs. R&D cannot be costlessly suspended and resumed.
Think of the cost of firing the researchers and the legally required termination payments. In this
case the Marshallian rule of negative Net Present Values (NPV) to shut down the activity does not
hold (Dixit, 1989). The presence of exit sunk costs requires the NPV to be greatly negative before
shutting down the plant. Therefore, in this context negative but not fatal jumps are quite likely to
occur and the SMPP accommodates for this feature.
For further explanations on the reasonability of Assumption 1, we refer to Subsection 3.5.
4The SMPP assumption is not strictly necessary to allow the process to take on positive jumps, but it is essential
to introduce random sizes and derive our theoretical estimation result.
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3.3 Competitors’ cash flow: processes Uk.
The sequence of couples Uk = (τ
Uk
i , ξ
Uk
i ) formalizes the process describing times and sizes of the
cash flow of the k-th firm, with k = 1, . . . , N , as they are perceived by A. The process Uk collects
the k-th firm’s cash flow associated to the development of new technologies having the chance to
take out new patents, including P¯ . It can be considered as a proxy for the R&D progress of the N
firms playing the race. The randomness in Uk also allows to capture the asymmetric information
context, in that A cannot perfectly forecast the realizations of Uk. The dependence between S and
Uk is conveniently modeled as follows.
Fix k = 1, . . . , N . Define Wk = {(w
(i)
1k , w
(i)
2k , w
(i)
3k )}i∈N, which are assumed to be i.i.d. and indepen-
dent from S and take values in WUk = [0,+∞)
2 × R, and define a transformation
φUk : [0,+∞)× R×WUk → [0,+∞)× R
such that
φUk(τ
S
i , ξ
S
i , w
(i)
1k , w
(i)
2k , w
(i)
3k ) = (τ
S
i + w
(i)
1k , w
(i)
2k ξ
S
i e
w
(i)
3k τ
S
i ), i ∈ N. (4)
w
(i)
1k , w
(i)
2k , w
(i)
3k are random variables as in (7), and represent a stochastic delay, a stochastic scale
factor and a random growth factor, respectively.
By defining
τUki = τ
S
i + w
(i)
1k , ξ
Uk
i = w
(i)
2k ξ
S
i e
w
(i)
3k τ
S
i ∀ i ∈ N, (5)
we obtain a representation of the process Uk.
3.4 Cash flow: process T .
T is the process followed by A’s cash flow and represents the underlying asset of the proposed
real option model. In the Introduction, we have seen that given the long time profile of research
projects, revisions to investment plans are very common in patenting activity. Therefore, without
loss of generality, we can assume that the R&D process involves a regular flow and an extraordinary
flow.
The regular flow aims at capturing the deterministic expenses sustained periodically by A to increase
R&D. It is composed of a sequence of annuities occurring at fixed dates. Spector and Zuckerman
(1997) report that various R&D projects are developed at a constant effort, in order to avoid the
high cost associated with hiring and firing of highly qualified research workers. The regular flow
captures this characteristic of R&D, allowing also for varying scheduled expenses. However, not
all expenses can be known in advance, so that a random component still remains. In this respect,
the extraordinary flow captures the random amounts paid out at random times, driven by the
shocks occurring in the economic context. Finally, the extraordinary flow is associated to inflows
and outflows connected to the project, and it is meant to capture technical uncertainty and input
9
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cost uncertainty. Hence, the sources of the realizations of the extraordinary flow are the processes
S and Uk, with k = 1, . . . , N . Accordingly, we split the extraordinary flow in N + 1 processes TS ,
T1, . . . , TN , that are related to the jumps of T due to S, U1, . . . , UN , respectively.
Formally, the process T is a sum of N + 2 terms:
T = TO + TS +
N∑
k=1
Tk,
where TO = {(ui, zi)}i∈N is the regular flow, with ui ≥ 0 and zi ≤ 0 respectively representing the
deterministic time and size of the i-th jump in the ordinary expenses. It is worth recalling that the
process TO stops when the technology related to P¯ is fully developed, at time τ1. From that point
onwards A should choose the optimal time τ2 for taking out the patent. Formally, the threshold τ1
-if ever reached- can be viewed as an upper bound to the time of the jumps occurring in TO.
TS , T1, . . . , TN are the point processes describing the extraordinary flow, dependent on the processes
S, U1, . . . , UN . It will turn out useful to denote as T
E the extraordinary flow of the process T , i.e.
TE = TS +
N∑
k=1
Tk. (6)
The process TS = {(τ
TS
i , ξ
TS
i )}i∈N can be described by introducing a sequence of trivariate i.i.d.
random variables
WTS = {(w
(i)
1 , w
(i)
2 , w
(i)
3 )}i∈N,
which are assumed to be independent from S and take values in WTS = [0,+∞)
2 × R, and a
transformation
φTS : [0,+∞)× R×WTS → [0,+∞)× R
such that
φTS (τ
S
i , ξ
S
i , w
(i)
1 , w
(i)
2 , w
(i)
3 ) = (τ
S
i + w
(i)
1 , w
(i)
2 ξ
S
i e
w
(i)
3 τ
S
i ), i ∈ N. (7)
By defining
τTSi = τ
S
i + w
(i)
1 , ξ
TS
i = w
(i)
2 ξ
S
i e
w
(i)
3 τ
S
i ∀ i ∈ N, (8)
we have a representation of the process TS associated to the jumps of the process S.
w
(i)
1 , w
(i)
2 , w
(i)
3 are random variables representing a stochastic delay, a stochastic scale factor and a
random growth factor, respectively. They translate times and sizes of the jumps of the exogenous
process S in terms of times and sizes of A’s cash flow. The exponential term in the expression of ξTSi
captures the evidence that the effect on the value of the project of an occurrence in the economic
environment is also time dependent.
The random quantities τTSi and ξ
TS
i are the time and size of the i-th jump in the cash flow process
for A, generated by the i-th event in the economic framework, respectively. In (8), the functional
form of the random time, τTSi = τ
S
i + w
(i)
1 , is such to accommodate situations in which there is a
10
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jump in the exogenous process that induces a jump in the cash flow at a later random time. Think of
an environmental regulation forcing the firms to invest in expensive ”scrubbers” or to buy tradable
”allowances” that allow them to pollute, a sort of Clean Air Act. Most of the time the regulation
does not force the firms to comply immediately with the new standard, letting the firm deciding
when it is optimal to delay the green investment within a reasonable amount of time. In other words,
there is a random delay between the jump in the exogenous process S and the related jumps in T .
The functional form of the size of T , ξTSi = w
(i)
2 ξ
S
i e
w
(i)
3 τ
S
i , is such to accommodate the ambiguous
relationship between good/bad news (Baudry and Dumont, 2006) and a jump in the cash flow. A
straightforward example of good news is one that makes the total cost decrease, e.g. a reduction in
input cost for any reason, but also good news that make the firm more eager to invest are conceiv-
able. If a new regulation requiring clean energy adoption is enacted while the firm A is investing
in more efficient solar panels, the firm will be spurred to finish the R&D phase as soon as possible,
in order to commercialize the new product. For this reason, the effect of the news described by the
random jump ξSi is reduced or amplified by a random factor w
(i)
2 , which can take values in (0, 1)
(case of reduction) or in (1,+∞) (case of amplification). When w
(i)
2 = 0, the news ξ
S
i has no impact
on the R&D process. The random variable w
(i)
3 is also responsible for the amplification/reduction
of the importance of the news in A’s cash flows, but in this case such a term is time dependent.
For instance, a demand increase in the future patented good clearly makes the cash flow jump in
different ways when the R&D phase is just at the beginning or when the patent is going to be
obtained in a short period of time. Yet, think of the case of a new drug against a flu developed at
the beginning or at the end of a flu epidemic course.
Now, fix k = 1, . . . , N , define the process Tk = {(τ
Tk
i , ξ
Tk
i )}i∈N and denote Uk = {(τ
Uk
i , ξ
Uk
i )}i∈N. To
understand the nature of the link between T and Uk, some explanations are in order.
In a competitive economic framework different types of managerial strategies can be adopted. One
of the most natural ones is for A to establish economic relationships with some of the other firms
populating the market. In doing so, the firms cluster in two families: A’s partners and A′s rivals.
We then suppose the existence of Np partners and Nr = N −Np rivals. Now, the process Tk has to
be defined by taking into account this distinction. Without loss of generality, we can order the N
partners such that 1, . . . , Np are A’s partners, while Np + 1, . . . , N are rivals.
Partnership or competitiveness are key issues to study the effect produced by a jump in Uk on A’s
cash flow. Moreover, in a complex economic system, several technologies and related patents are
under development at the same time. Therefore, a jump in the k-th firm’s R&D process may induce
different effects on the value of P¯ for A, depending on the relationship between A and the k-th
firm, as well as on the degree of similarity between patents. In order to clarify the latter point
we introduce an index α
(i)
k ∈ [0, 1], representing a normalized measure of the distance between the
technology contained in the patent under scrutiny, P¯ , and the one related to the i-th jump in Uk.
11
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We assume α
(i1)
k < α
(i2)
k when the technology implemented for P¯ is closer to that related to the i2-th
jump than to the one related to the i1-th jump. The limit cases are α
(i)
k = 0, occurring when the
i-th jump has nothing to do with P¯ , and α
(i)
k = 1, occurring when the k-th firm takes out patent P¯ .
Such an index enables also to consider the interconnections between different sectors in the economy.
That is, firms operating in the same sector are more likely to compete on very similar projects. If
the k-th firm operates in the same sector of A, then the index α
(i)
k exhibits a high value for each
i. Therefore, it is more likely that if a firm, say the k-th one, operating in the same sector of A takes
out a patent, we will have a value of α
(i)
k not far from 1. The case of a small value of α
(i)
k is more
likely to occur when the k-th firm operates in different sectors from A’s, as its investments aim at
different goals. Moreover, the presence of the index α
(i)
k makes the patent race quite general in the
sense that it may be either a winner-takes-all game, when α
(i)
k = 1, or a winner-does-not-take-all
game, when α
(i)
k ∈ [0, 1).
Let us turn now to the relationship between Uk and T for A’s rivals or partners. We analyze first
the case of partnership, k ∈ {1, . . . , Np}.
Define the sequence of trivariate i.i.d. random variables YP,k = {(y
(i)
1k , y
(i)
2k , y
(i)
3k )}i∈N, which are as-
sumed to be independent from S and take values in YP,k = [0,+∞)
2×R, and define a transformation
φP,k : [0,+∞)× R× YP,k → [0,+∞)× R
such that
φP,k(τ
Uk
i , ξ
Uk
i , y
(i)
1k , y
(i)
2k , y
(i)
3k ) = (τ
Uk
i + y
(i)
1k , (1− e
−α
(i)
k )[y
(i)
2k ξ
Uk
i e
y
(i)
3k τ
Uk
i ]), i ∈ N. (9)
The relation between Uk and T in this case is formalized by defining
τTki = τ
Uk
i + y
(i)
1k , ξ
Tk
i = (1− e
−α
(i)
k )[y
(i)
2k ξ
Uk
i e
y
(i)
3k τ
Uk
i ] ∀ i ∈ N. (10)
y
(i)
1k is a random delay, y
(i)
2k is a random scale factor and y
(i)
3k is a random growth factor.
The definition of φP,k is in accordance with that of φTS in (7), with a couple of key differences.
A random delay appears, due to the possible delay in the propagation of information from k to
A. A term related to α
(i)
k is introduced, in order to describe the dependence of ξ
Tk
i on the type of
technology implemented. If a new attainment is made by a partner of A, and such an attainment
is complementary to P¯ -in the sense that it helps the attainment of P¯ - then A benefits from this
jump, and the value of the patent will increase. In this respect, we notice that the function
h : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] | h(α
(i)
k ) = 1− e
−α
(i)
k (11)
is increasing with respect to α
(i)
k and null when α
(i)
k = 0. Hence, h in (11) is a suitable choice for
capturing the dependence between jumps and developed technologies. The fact that the function
h(·) at its maximum does not reach unity for α
(i)
k = 1 is irrelevant because it is multiplied by a
12
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random scale factor in (9), y
(i)
2k , which magnifies or dampens the impact of ξ
Uk
i on ξ
Tk
i . Again, y
(i)
3k
is a random growth factor, and it formalizes the time dependence, as explained in the discussion of
φTS .
Let us now assume that k ∈ {Np + 1, . . . , N}, i.e. k is A’s rival.
The relationship between T and Uk, with k being A’s rival is similar to that between T and Uk with
k partner, but with an opposite sign.
Define the sequence of trivariate i.i.d. random variables ZR,k = {(z
(i)
1k , z
(i)
2k , z
(i)
3k )}i∈N, which are
assumed to be independent from S and take values in ZR,k = [0,+∞)
2 × R, and introduce a
transformation
φR,k : [0,+∞)× R×ZR,k → [0,+∞)× R
such that
φR,k(τ
Uk
i , ξ
Uk
i , z
(i)
1k , z
(i)
2k , z
(i)
3k ) = (τ
Uk
i + z
(i)
1k , (e
−α
(i)
k − 1)[z
(i)
2k ξ
Uk
i e
z
(i)
3k τ
Uk
i ]), i ∈ N. (12)
As usual, we formalize the relationship between Uk and T by assuming:
τTki = τ
Uk
i + z
(i)
1k , ξ
Tk
i = (e
−α
(i)
k − 1)[z
(i)
2k ξ
Uk
i e
z
(i)
3k τ
Uk
i ] ∀ i ∈ N. (13)
z
(i)
1k is a random delay, z
(i)
2k is a random scale factor and z
(i)
3k is a random growth factor.
In the rest of the paper, we refer to T = (τTi , ξ
T
i ) when referring to the process T without considering
which process drives the jumps.
3.5 Preliminary comments and results
Table (1) schematically reports the relationships between the source of uncertainty and the process
capturing it.
Table 1: Type of uncertainty captured by the process
Process Type of uncertainty captured by the process
cash flow, T cash flow, technical uncertainty (cost-to-completion)
Exogenous shock, S macroeconomic shocks, catastrophic events, change in laws, etc.)
other firms’ cash flow, Uk competitive environment, asymmetric informations, asymmetric cost structure
It is worth noting that the same sort of transmission mechanism for the exogenous shocks on A
applies to the other N firms. That is, the value of the N firms’ projects are supposed to be random
and similar to A’s, although not perfectly identical because, in general,
(w
(i)
1k , w
(i)
2k , w
(i)
3k ) 6= (w
(i)
1 , w
(i)
2 , w
(i)
3 ), ∀ k = 1, . . . , N, (14)
and
(w
(i)
1k1
, w
(i)
2k1
, w
(i)
3k1
) 6= (w
(i)
1k2
, w
(i)
2k2
, w
(i)
3k2
), k1 6= k2. (15)
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Beyond the obvious statement on different effects of the same event on firms pursuing different
new technologies, conditions (14) and (15) meet also the evidence of asymmetric cost structure
among firms belonging to the same or different sectors. The choice of investment cost asymmetry
can be motivated by a number of reasons (Pawlina and Kort, 2006). First of all, investment cost
asymmetry is present when firms have different access to capital markets. The cost of capital of a
firm facing liquidity constraints is higher than that of its counterpart having access to a credit line
or with substantial cash reserves (Lensink et al., 2001). Furthermore, cost asymmetry occurs when
the firms exhibit a different degree of organizational flexibility in implementing a new production
technology. This flexibility, known as absorptive capacity, measures the firm’s ability to adopt
external technologies, to adapt to a changing economic environment, and to commercialize newly
invented products. A higher absorptive capacity is therefore equivalent to a lower cost associated
with an investment project (Cohen and Levital, 1994). Yet, the difference in investment costs can be
justified on the ground of purely exogenous factors, resulting, among others, from the intervention
of the authority. For instance, the effective investment cost of the firms is reduced after obtaining
governmental credit guarantee, which results in a lower cost of capital (evidence can be found in
Klemeier and Megginson, 2000; Zecchini and Ventura, 2009).
By a purely mathematical point of view, formulas (7) and (4) show that there is a correlation
structure between ξTSi and (τ
S
i , ξ
S
i ) as well as between ξ
Uk
i and (τ
S
i , ξ
S
i ). This fact does not allow
to consider S as a stochastic process on the line, and we need to treat S as a Spatial Point Process.
In this respect, the benefits of assuming S to be a SMPP are twofold. First of all, it provides a
model for simultaneously estimating the number and the size of the jumps in the economy and,
consequently, the number and the size of the cash flows of the N + 1 firms populating the market,
including A, and related to P¯ . Secondly, according to some recent results, SMPPs can guarantee
the invariance of the stochastic structure between S, TS and Uk, for each k (see Theorem 1). The
same argument applies to the correlation structure between ξTki and (τ
Uk
i , ξ
Uk
i ), shown in (9) and
(12).
In order to be self-contained, we introduce the formal definition of SMPP.
Let us consider a measure space (Rk,B(Rk),M), where B(Rk) is the Borel σ-algebra and M is
absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure. We also introduce a nonnegative
random variable Λ with probability distribution Π : R→ [0, 1].
Definition 1. A spatial process S is Mixed Poisson with mixing distribution Π and baseline intensity
measure M(·) if and only if, for I ∈ B(Rk) and for n ∈ N,
P (S(I) = n) =
∫ ∞
0
e−λM(I)
[λM(I)]n
n!
dΠ(λ). (16)
We now need an important invariant result, already known in the literature (see e.g. Cinlar (1995))
and a proof based on stochastic geometrical arguments can be found in Foschi and Spizzichino
14
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(2008).
Theorem 1. Let Assumption 1 be satisfied and consider a sequence of i.i.d. random variables
W = {Wi}i∈N, with distribution G and independent of S.
Then T = Φφ(S,W) is a SMPP with the same mixing distribution Π and intensity measure
M∗(J) =
∫
Rn
M(φ−1w (J))dG(w), (17)
where J ⊆ Y and X ∈ φ−1w (J) if and only if φ(X,w) ∈ J .
Theorem 1 is a key result in our work, since it explains the invariance of SMPPs with respect to a
very general class of transformations. As a consequence, we can write:
Proposition 1. Let Assumption 1 be satisfied. Then TS, T1, . . . , TN are SMPPs, with the same
mixing distribution and baseline intensity measures M (S), M (1), . . . ,M (N) as in (17), respectively.
It is worth noting that, even if the sizes of the stochastic jumps are theoretically unbounded, we
argue that the cash flow of a firm may not be infinite. Similarly the quantitative process capturing
the entity of the news appearing in the economic environment should be bounded, at least from
below, by the game over conditions. Thus, without loss of generality, one can reasonably assume
the existence of positive upper and negative lower thresholds for the stochastic processes describing
uncertainty in the underlying asset. Therefore, hereafter we assume the existence of the positive
constants aS , aT , a1, . . . , aN such that, fixed i ∈ N, ξ
S
i , ξ
T
i , ξ
U1
i , . . . , ξ
UN
i are random variables with
support in [−aS , aS ], [−aT , aT ], [−a1, a1], . . . , [−aN , aN ], respectively.
4 The game over conditions
In a patent race context, firm A loses the competition in two cases:
(i) when A abandons the project to develop the technology associated to P¯ ;
(ii) when the technology has been already developed by A, but someone else registers the patent
P¯ before A.
The cases (i) and (ii) correspond to a certain jump in A’s cash flow, which has been named in the
Introduction as killing jump. In both cases, we achieve a situation where the cash flow process T
stops, and the value of the project remains permanently below the threshold Γ in (2).
To model this occurrence, we need to introduce a time dependent threshold:
Θ : [0,+∞)→ [0,+∞) | t 7→ Θ(t) (18)
such that Θ kills the value of the patent, e.g.
ξTi ≤ −Θ(τ
T
i )⇐⇒ ξ
T
j = 0, ∀j > i.
15
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If the threshold Θ is reached, then the process T stops and firm A loses the competition. The
occurrence of a killing jump may depend on a very bad news, the so-called catastrophic event,
originated in the economic environment, and captured by a jump in the process S, such as the
situation where the patentable drug turns out to have terrible side effects. In this respect, there
exists a time dependent threshold
γ : [0,+∞)→ [0,+∞) | t 7→ γt (19)
such that
ξTSi ≤ −Θ(τ
TS
i ), for ξ
S
i ≤ −γτSi . (20)
A killing jump may also depend on the registration of the patent P¯ by another firm. The conse-
quences in the long-run of this event differ according to the nature of the relationship between A and
the winning firm, i.e. partnership or rivalry. However, the analysis of the future exploitation of the
technology related to P¯ is out of the scope of this paper. We can generally say that the registration
of P¯ by the k-th firm is the end of the patent race, for each k = 1, . . . , N . This fact involves the
relationship between the processes Uk and T , and is associated only to the case of α
(i)
k = 1.
Analogously to γt defined in (19), there exists a time dependent threshold
ψ : [0,+∞)→ [0,+∞) | t 7→ ψt (21)
such that
ξTki ≤ −Θ(τ
Tk
i ), for ξ
Uk
i ≤ −ψτUk
i
. (22)
5 The value of the project
As clearly explained by Pakes and Simpson (1989) and Shankerman and Pakes (1986), fixed t ≥ 0,
Ct can be regarded as the value at time t of the project associated to the patent P¯ . Actually, Ct
is a random variable in that it sums up also the discounted future random cash flow of A, and the
estimate of the patent value will be pursued through the computation of its conditioned expected
value.
In details, consistently with the definition of T and formula (6), we write Ct as the sum of the
contributions due to the ordinary and extraordinary flows or, more formally, as the discounted sum
of the processes TO, TS , T1, . . . , TN :
Ct = C
TO
t + C
TE
t , (23)
where
CT
E
t = C
TS
t +
N∑
k=1
CTkt , (24)
16
Page 17 of 30
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/imaman
Manuscripts submitted to IMA Journal of Management Mathematics
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
and the superscripts indicate the reference processes. By (24), the terms in the right-hand side of
(23) can be written as: 

CTOt =
∑+∞
i=1 ziβ
ui−t1{t≤τ1}
CTSt =
∑+∞
i=1 ξ
TS
i β
τ
TS
i
−t
CTkt =
∑+∞
i=1 ξ
Tk
i β
τ
Tk
i
−t
(25)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is an appropriate discount factor. By inserting the game over conditions and by
formula (25), (23) becomes:
Ct =
+∞∑
i=1
[
ziβ
ui−t1{t≤ui≤τ1} + ξ
TS
i β
τ
TS
i
−t +
N∑
k=1
ξTki β
τ
Tk
i
−t
]
·1{
ξ
TS
i
>−Θ(τ
TS
i
)
}
∩
[⋂
N
k=1{ξ
Tk
i
>−Θ(τ
Tk
i
)}∩{α
(i)
k
6=1}
]
(26)
A Bayesian-type mechanism for the estimation of the expected value of CT
E
t in (26) is now provided,
following the approach of Cerqueti et al. (2009).
Define a time interval
I = [r1, r2]
with 0 < r1 < r2. The interval I represents the period under scrutiny, and constitutes the basic set
of the Bayesian estimate.
The shocks in the economic environment become delayed jumps of the process TE . Therefore, if
we consider the jumps in S at times τSi ∈ I, then the corresponding jumps of the process T
E may
occur in I or after r2.
We now define the regions IS ≡ I × [−aS , aS ], IT ≡ I × [−aT , aT ] and Ik ≡ I × [−ak, ak], for
k = 1, . . . , N .
In agreement with a commonly used mathematical notation, we introduce D ⊆ R2 and denote by
S(D), T (D), U1(D), . . . , UN (D) the number of the elements of the Spatial Point Process S, T
E ,
U1, . . . , UN respectively, that are contained in D.
Being the SMPPs simple processes (see Cerqueti et al., 2009) and being regions IS , IT , I1, . . . , IN
bounded, then E[S(IS)] < +∞, E[T
E(IT )] < +∞ and E[Uk(Ik)] < +∞, for each k = 1, . . . , N .
Moreover, the Bayesian-type mechanism is based on the knowledge of the cash flows of A related to
P¯ and the jumps in the economic environment occurring over the time interval under scrutiny I.
Define the time interval H = [t,+∞), with t > r2, and the region H = H× [−aT , aT ].
Remark 1. We will assume hereafter that E[T (H)] < +∞. As a supporting argument, we can say
that the cash flows of A related to P¯ are measured in units of currency, and so the future cash flows
cannot be unbounded, even if they are aggregated.
The conditional expectation of CT
E
t will be approximated by the knowledge of the following quan-
tities:
17
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• the number S(IS) of jumps in the economy during the interval I;
• the number TE(IT ) of the jumps in the cash flow of A during I. Such a quantity is the
aggregation of the contributions of the processes TS , T1, . . . , TN , i.e.:
TE(IT ) = TS(IS) +
N∑
k=1
Tk(Ik);
• the number of jumps in the economy occurred over I propagated to A’s cash flow in the same
time interval. We denote this quantity as TE(IS)(IT )
5, and it is given by the aggregation of the
contributions of the processes TS , T1, . . . , TN , i.e.:
TE(IS)(IT ) = TS(IS)(IS) +
N∑
k=1
Tk(IS)(Ik).
We consider two partitions ∆ and Ψ of H as follows:
∆j = {H
(j)
r }r=1,...,j , j ∈ N, (27)
where H
(j)
r = H × (c
(j)
r−1, c
(j)
r ], with r = 1, . . . , j, c
(j)
0 = −aT , c
(j)
j = aT and, for each j, {c
(j)
r } is
increasing with respect to r;
Ψh = {G
(h)
v }v=1,...,h, h ∈ N, (28)
where G
(h)
v = [t
(h)
v−1, t
(h)
v )× [−aT , aT ], with v = 1, . . . , h, t
(h)
0 = t, t
(h)
h = +∞ and, for each h, {t
(h)
v }
is increasing with respect to v.
A further refined partition of H can be obtained by the intersection of the partitions defined in (27)
and (28). We have
∆j ∩Ψh =
{
H(j)r ∩G
(h)
v
}
v≤h; r≤j
j, h ∈ N. (29)
Now, define the event
A(I) =
{
S(IS) = pS , TS(IS) = nS , T1(I1) = n1, . . . , TN (IN ) = nN ,
TS(IS)(IS) = mS , T1(IS)(I1) = m1, . . . , TN(IS)(IN ) = mN
}
. (30)
We fix the four integers r, v, h, j and denote by b
(j,h)
r,v the expected number of jumps modeling A’s
cash flow observed in the time interval (t
(h)
v−1, t
(h)
v ] with size (c
(j)
r−1, c
(j)
r ], conditioned on the previous
history in period I. i.e.
b(j,h)r,v ≡ E
[
T (H(j)r ∩G
(h)
v ) |A(I)
]
. (31)
The next result provides a closed form expression to compute b
(j,h)
r,v , for any (j, h) ∈ N2 and (r, v) ∈
{1, . . . , j} × {1, . . . , h}. To proceed, following the definition of the event A(I) in (30), a distinction
between the sources of the jumps of TE is needed.
5The interested reader can find a formal derivation of TE
(IS)
(IT ) in the Appendix.
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Proposition 2.
b(j,h)r,v =
∑
k¯∈{S,1,...,N}
[
+∞∑
n=0
n∑
l=0
n · Γ1(k¯) · Γ2(k¯) · Γ3(k¯) · Γ4(k¯)
]
, (32)
with 

Γ1(k¯) =
[M
(k¯)
(IS)
(H(j)r ∩G
(h)
v )]
n−l
(n−l)!
Γ2(k¯) =
[M
(k¯)
(IS)
(H(j)r ∩G
(h)
v )]
l
l!
Γ3(k¯) =
∫ +∞
0
λn−le
−λM
(k¯)
(IS)
(H(j)r ∩G
(h)
v )u(λ; IS , Ik¯, pS , nk¯,mk¯)dλ
Γ4(k¯) =
∫ +∞
0
λle
−λM
(k¯)
(IS)
(H(j)r ∩G
(h)
v )u(λ; IS , Ik¯, pS , nk¯,mk¯)dλ.
(33)
where M
(k¯)
(IS)
is the baseline intensity measure of the SMPP Tk¯(IS) and
u(λ; IS , Ik¯, pS , nk¯,mk¯) =
λnk¯−mk¯+pSe
−λ[M
(k¯)
(IS)
(Ik¯)+M
(k¯)(IS)]u(λ)∫ ∞
0
λnk¯−mk¯+pSe
−λ[M
(k¯)
(IS)
(Ik¯)+M
(k¯)(IS)]u(λ)dλ
(34)
is the posterior distribution of Λ.
Proof. First of all, we notice that
b(j,h)s,v ≡
∑
k¯=S,1,...,N
E
[
Tk(H
(j)
s ∩G
(h)
v ) |S(IS) = pS , Tk¯(IT ) = nk¯, Tk¯(IS)(IT ) = mk¯
]
. (35)
Therefore, it is sufficient to prove that, for a given k¯ ∈ {S, 1, . . . , N}, we have
E
[
Tk¯(H
(j)
s ∩G
(h)
v ) |S(IS) = pS , Tk¯(IT ) = nk¯, Tk¯(IS)(IT ) = mk¯
]
=
+∞∑
n=0
n∑
l=0
n·Γ1(k¯)·Γ2(k¯)·Γ3(k¯)·Γ4(k¯).
(36)
We can write:
P (Tk¯(H
(j)
s ∩G
(h)
v ) = n |S(IS) = pS , Tk¯(IT ) = nk¯, Tk¯(IS)(IT ) = mk¯)
=
+∞∑
l=0
P (Tk¯(H
(j)
s ∩G
(h)
v ) = n |S(IS) = pS , Tk¯(IT ) = nk¯, Tk¯(IS)(IT ) = mk¯, Tk¯(IS)(H
(j)
s ∩G
(h)
v ) = l)×
×P (Tk¯(IS)(H
(j)
s ∩G
(h)
v ) = l |S(IS) = pS , Tk¯(IT ) = nk¯, Tk¯(IS)(IT ) = mk¯), (37)
where the conditioning on the event Tk¯(IS)(H
(j)
s ∩G
(h)
v ) = l has been removed by summing on the
index l.
Therefore, by Theorem 2 of Cerqueti et al. (2009), we can rewrite (37) as follows:
P (Tk¯(H
(j)
s ∩G
(h)
v ) = n |S(IS) = pS , Tk¯(IT ) = nk¯, Tk¯(IS)(IT ) = mk¯) =
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=
n∑
l=0
Γ1(k¯) · Γ2(k¯) · Γ3(k¯) · Γ4(k¯). (38)
Since
E
[
Tk¯(H
(j)
s ∩G
(h)
v ) = n |S(IS) = pS , Tk¯(IT ) = nk¯, Tk¯(IS)(IT ) = mk¯
]
=
=
+∞∑
n=0
n · P (Tk¯(H
(j)
s ∩G
(h)
v ) = n |S(IS) = pS , Tk¯(IT ) = nk¯, Tk¯(IS)(IT ) = mk¯), (39)
and by (38), the result is proved.
Proposition 2 allows to get an upper and a lower approximation of E[CT
E
t |A(I)].
Consider the following sequences:
φ¯j,h =
j∑
r=1
h∑
v=1
c(j)r β
t−t
(h)
v−1b(j,h)r,v ,
φˆj,h =
j∑
r=1
h∑
v=1
c
(j)
r−1β
t−t(h)v b(j,h)r,v .
For any j, h ∈ N, we have
φˆj,h ≤ E[C
TE
t |A] ≤ φ¯j,h. (40)
{φˆj,h} is non-decreasing and {φ¯j,h} is non-increasing with respect to j and h.
We now conveniently thicken the decomposition ∆j ∩Ψh in (29). Assume that
lim
j→+∞
c(j)r − c
(j)
r−1 = 0, ∀ r ∈ {1, . . . , j}, (41)
and
c
(j)
0 = −aT and lim
j→+∞
c
(j)
j = aT . (42)
Moreover, assume that
lim
h→+∞
t(h)v − t
(h)
v−1 = 0, ∀ v ∈ {1, . . . , h}, (43)
and
t
(h)
0 = t and lim
h→+∞
t
(h)
h = +∞. (44)
Under conditions (41-44), we have that
⋃
j,h∈N
∆j ∩Ψh = H, (45)
and there exists a nonnegative constant dependent on t, named p(t), such that
lim
j,h→+∞
φˆj,h = lim
j,h→+∞
φ¯j,h = p(t).
p(t) represents the Bayesian estimate of the value of the patent accruing from the extraordinary
flow. Indeed, by (40), taking the limit, we can conclude that
E[CT
E
t |A(I)] = p(t). (46)
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We now add also CTOt to C
TE
t of (46), and derive an estimate for Ct. By (26) we have:
E[Ct |A] = p(t) + E
{
+∞∑
i=1
ziβ
ui−t1{t≤ui≤τ1} · 1
{
ξ
TS
i
>−Θ(τ
TS
i
)
}
∩
[⋂
N
k=1
(
{ξ
Tk
i
>−Θ(τ
Tk
i
)}∩{α
(i)
k
6=1}
)]
}
=
= p(t)+
+∞∑
i=1
ziβ
ui−t1{t≤ui}P (ui ≤ τ1)·P
({
ξTSi > −Θ(τ
TS
i )
}
∩
[
N⋂
k=1
(
{ξTki > −Θ(τ
Tk
i )} ∩ {α
(i)
k 6= 1}
)])
.
(47)
In order to solve (47) we need to compute the probabilities involved in it. Denote by F1 the
probability distribution of the random variable τ1. Then:
P (ui ≤ τ1) = 1− F1(ui). (48)
The variable α
(i)
k may be assumed discrete. We have:
P (α
(i)
k 6= 1) = 1− P (α
(i)
k = 1). (49)
Define the time dependent set IΘ(t) ⊆ R
2 as follows:
IΘ(t) = {(s, ζ(s)) ∈ [t,+∞)× R | ζ(s) ≤ −Θ(s)} , ∀ t ≥ 0. (50)
The game over conditions, obtained counting the jumps such that P (ξTSi > −Θ(τ
TS
i )) and P (ξ
Tk
i >
−Θ(τTki )) can be expressed through the processes TS and Tk, respectively, and the set IΘ(t) defined
in (50). Let us explain this point. We develop the theory only for TS , being the case of Tk analogous.
Start with i = 1 and suppose that ξTS1 > −Θ(τ
TS
1 ). Then go to i = 2 and check if ξ
TS
2 > −Θ(τ
TS
2 ). If
this is the case, go to i = 3 and so on. The process stops at jump ı¯, where ξTSı¯ ≤ −Θ(τ
TS
ı¯ ). We then
argue that the number of realizations of TS falling in the set IΘ(t) becomes equals to 1 for i = ı¯.
Consider now the set {t
(h)
v }, with h ∈ N and v = 1, . . . , h, introduced in (28) and assume that the
conditions (43) and (44) are fulfilled. Construct a partition of IΘ(t) with elements defined as follows:
IvΘ(t) = IΘ(t) ∩
{
[t
(+∞)
v−1 , t
(+∞)
v )× R
}
, ∀ t ≥ 0 and v ∈ N. (51)
Since TS is a simple process and by condition (43) we can assume that there exists an index dependent
on i, say v(i) ∈ N such that τTSi ∈ [t
(+∞)
v(i)−1, t
(+∞)
v(i) ) and τ
TS
i+1 ≥ t
(+∞)
v(i) , for each i ∈ N.
For the arguments developed above, we have a critical threshold associated to ı¯, say v¯(¯ı), such that
the number of realizations of the process TS falling in I
v
Θ(t) is 0, for v = 1, . . . , v¯(¯ı)− 1, while it is 1
when v = v¯(¯ı). Therefore, the index v¯(¯ı) can be defined as:
v¯(¯ı) = inf

v(¯ı) ∈ N such that
v(ı¯)∑
n=1
TS(I
n
Θ(t)) = 1

 . (52)
We put a subscript S and k to v, to distinguish the cases of TS and Tk. The process TS and Tk are
not independent, since they both depend on the realizations of S. Therefore:
P
({
ξTSi > −Θ(τ
TS
i )
}
∩
[
N⋂
k=1
(
{ξTki > −Θ(τ
Tk
i )} ∩ {α
k
i 6= 1}
)])
=
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=
[
1− P (α
(i)
k = 1)
]
× P
({
ξTSi > −Θ(τ
TS
i )
}
|
N⋂
k=1
{ξTki > −Θ(τ
Tk
i )}
)
×
×P
(
{ξTNi > −Θ(τ
TN
i )} |
N−1⋂
k=1
{ξTki > −Θ(τ
Tk
i )}
)
×
× · · · × P
(
{ξT2i > −Θ(τ
T2
i )} | {ξ
T1
i > −Θ(τ
T1
i )}
)
× P
(
{ξT1i > −Θ(τ
T1
i )}
)
. (53)
Hence, by (53), the game over conditions in (47) become:
P
({
ξTSi > −Θ(τ
TS
i )
}
∩
[
N⋂
k=1
(
{ξTki > −Θ(τ
Tk
i )} ∩ {α
k
i 6= 1}
)])
=
=
[
1− P (α
(i)
k = 1)
]
× P
(
TS
(
I
vS(i)
Θ (t)−
[
N⋃
k=1
I
vk(i)
Θ (t)
])
= 0
)
×
×P
(
TN
(
I
vN (i)
Θ (t)−
[
N−1⋃
k=1
I
vk(i)
Θ (t)
])
= 0
)
×
× · · · × P
(
T2
(
I
v2(i)
Θ (t)− I
v1(i)
Θ (t)
)
= 0
)
× P
(
T1
(
I
v1(i)
Θ (t)
)
= 0
)
. (54)
By applying Definition 1, condition (54) becomes:
P
({
ξTSi > −Θ(τ
TS
i )
}
∩
[
N⋂
k=1
(
{ξTki > −Θ(τ
Tk
i )} ∩ {α
k
i 6= 1}
)])
=
[
1− P (α
(i)
k = 1)
]
×
∫ ∞
0
e
−λM(S)
(
I
vS(i)
Θ (t)−
[⋃N
k=1 I
vk(i)
Θ (t)
])
dΠ(λ)×
×
∫ ∞
0
e
−λM(N)
(
I
vN (i)
Θ (t)−
[⋃N−1
k=1 I
vk(i)
Θ (t)
])
dΠ(λ)×
× · · · ×
∫ ∞
0
e
−λM(2)
(
I
v2(i)
Θ (t)−I
v1(i)
Θ (t)
)
dΠ(λ)×
∫ ∞
0
e
−λM(1)
(
I
v1(i)
Θ (t)
)
dΠ(λ). (55)
Denote the right-hand side of (55) as Υ.
By substituting (48) and (55) into (47), we obtain:
E[Ct |A(I)] = p(t) +
+∞∑
i=1
ziβ
ui−t1{t≤ti} [1− F1(ui)]×Υ. (56)
Equation (56) claims that the value of the project is given by the sum of two components. The first
one, p(t), represents the discounted expected value of the jumps in the underlying security, while
the second one concerns the discounted expected value of the ordinary expenses. In this quantity,
the term [1− F1(·)] captures the presence of the stopping time τ1 associated to the random time at
which the new technology is fully developed and the term Υ represents the probability that a game
over condition does not occur.
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6 Implications of our analysis.
Despite its intuitive significance and the close similarity to the results present in the literature
(for instance see Miltersen and Schwartz, 2004, eq. 12) (56) reveals some critical considerations.
Looking at the time profile of the estimate we can claim that, p(t) comes from the algebraic sum of
two components:
p(t) = p
(a)
H (t) + p
(b)
H (t), (57)
where p
(a)
H (t) represents the jumps in the project due to the jumps in the economy occurred in H
and propagated in the same time period; p
(b)
H (t) represents the jumps in the project value due to the
jumps in the economy occurred before H and propagated in H.
Formula (57) is useful to compare the value of the project obtained under (56) with the value of
the project obtained under an alternative naive model. By naive model, we mean a model in which
no delay between the economy and the patent jump is assumed. Under this restrictive hypothesis,
let us denote by p˜H(t) the aggregation of future expected discounted value of the jumps in the cash
flow at time t, due to the jumps in the economy over a time interval H. The no delay condition
implies that
p˜H(t) = p
(a)
H (t), (58)
where p
(a)
H (t) is defined as in (57).
By (57) and (58), we generally have that p(t) 6= p˜H(t), since there is no reason to expect p
(b)
H (t) =
0. In other words, p(t) = p˜H(t) is a special case of (56) and its occurrence is purely accidental.
Therefore, we argue that paying a little price in terms of algebraic effort, the model better fits
the real world, providing us with a theoretical estimate of the value of the project. So far, the
comparison between our model and an alternative naive one has been kept as simple as possible,
but the divergence can be worsened if one considers also that computation of p(t) entails taking
into account some remarkable features of the race that a naive approach completely neglects. Such
as: the possibility of both positive and negative jumps, the possibility of non deadly jumps which
are usually omitted from the models, the possibility of either the winner-taks-all or the winner-does
not-take-all, the different sensitivity to exogenous shock of different firms. Put another way, the
higher the uncertainty in the race, the greater the divergence between p(t) and p˜H(t).
A quantitative appraisal of the difference is far beyond the scope of this paper. We limit ourselves
to bring to notice how neglecting some source of uncertainty can heavily bias the estimation of the
project.
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7 Conclusions and further research
The real option theory is based on the definition of an underlying asset which evolves stochastically
over time and uncertainty feeds back dynamically in the value of the derivative. In this paper we
have shown that by exploiting this basic idea it is possible to model patent race taking into account
the multiple sources of uncertainty it implies, without requiring unrealistic or abrupt assumptions,
such as winner-takes-all or winner-does-not-take-all. At the same time, we depart from the standard
real option framework by considering an underlying asset evolving in discrete time as a Spatial
Mixed Poisson Process. To our best knowledge, this is the first paper that models the entire set
of uncertainty sources in a unique framework, providing a theoretical estimate of the value of the
project. Moreover, the introduction of a distance measure between competing projects enables to
account for both complementarity between innovations and winner-takes-all as possible outcomes of
the race. Finally, our model allows to handle the case in which players of the race form alliances.
The Bayesian estimate of the value of the project derived in this work may constitute the basis
for the solution of an optimization problem regarding the optimal time of patent registration. For
a discussion of this aspect see Section 2. The empirical validation of our theoretical results may
represent a further challenging research theme to be explored. In this respect, it is worth noting that
the numerical analysis of the proposed estimation methodology is relevant both from an economic
and from a more quantitative perspective. Indeed, to the best of our knowledge, so far there are
no contributions in the literature reporting a sumulation of the SMPPs. Our future research efforts
will focus on these topics.
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Appendix
Formal derivation of T(IS)(I
∗
T
)
Let us define the random subset of indexes {i1, . . . , iK¯} ⊂ N, such that
{(τSi1 , ξ
S
i1
), . . . , (τSiK¯ , ξ
S
iK¯
)} = IS ∩ S. (59)
We notice that K¯ ≡ S(IS).
The game over conditions have to be taken into account. By (20), if there exists an index iK˜ < iK¯
26
Page 27 of 30
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/imaman
Manuscripts submitted to IMA Journal of Management Mathematics
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
in {i1, . . . , iK¯} such that ξ
S
iK˜
≤ −γτS
i
K˜
, then the patent race stops and the jumps of interest in IS ∩S
are {(τSi1 , ξ
S
i1
), . . . , (τSiK˜ , ξ
S
iK˜
)}. Therefore, we can introduce K = K¯ ∧ K˜ and rewrite (59) as:
{(τSi1 , ξ
S
i1
), . . . , (τSiK , ξ
S
iK
)} = I∗S ∩ S, (60)
and K ≡ S(I∗S). The superscript ∗ means that the number of elements of the process S in IS has to
be intended under the game over conditions (20).
The processes Uk are generated by the exogenous process S, for each k = 1, . . . , N . Therefore, fixed
k = 1, . . . , N , there exists a family of sets of indexes {jk,1, . . . , jk,K¯k} ⊂ {i1, . . . , iK}, such that:
{(τUkjk,1 , ξ
Uk
jk,1
), . . . , (τUkjk,K¯k
, ξUkjk,K¯k
)}, (61)
and K¯k ≡ Uk(I∗
S
)(Ik), where the subscript (I
∗
S) means that the cash flows of the processes Uk stem
from events captured by jumps of S occurring in IS under (20).
The game over condition (22) suggests that the jumps in the processes Uk leading to a jump in the
process TE are the ones befo e the killing jump. More formally, if an index jk,K˜k < jk,K¯k can be
found in {jk,1, . . . , jk,K¯k} such that ξ
Uk
jk,K˜k
≤ −ψ
τ
Uk
j
k,K˜k
, then the patent race stops. Analogously to
what we did in (60), we then define Kk = K¯k ∧ K˜k such that (61) can be rewritten as:
{(τUkjk,1 , ξ
Uk
jk,1
), . . . , (τUkjk,Kk
, ξUkjk,Kk
)}, (62)
and Kk ≡ Uk(I∗
S
)(I
∗
k), where the subscript ∗ on (Ik) means that the cash flows of the processes Uk are
counted in Ik under condition (22). The realizations of the process T
E derive by the jumps of S and
of the U ’s. Following the same argument proposed above and regarding the jumps in TE grounded
on jumps of S in IS , we can say that there exist some set of indexes {l1, . . . , lKT,S} ⊂ {i1, . . . , iK}
and {nk,1, . . . , nk,KT,k} ⊂ {jk,1, . . . , jk,Kk}, for k = 1, . . . , N , such that
IT ∩ T
E = {(τTl1 , ξ
T
l1
), . . . , (τTlKT,S
, ξTlKT,S
)} ∪
[
N⋃
k=1
{(τTnk,1 , ξ
T
nk,1
), . . . , (τTnk,KT,k
, ξTnKk,T,k
)}
]
. (63)
In this case
TE(IS)(IT ) ≡ KT,S +
N∑
k=1
KT,k.
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